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Abstract—Camera fingerprints are precious tools for a number
of image forensics tasks. A well-known example is the photo
response non-uniformity (PRNU) noise pattern, a powerful device
fingerprint. Here, to address the image forgery localization
problem, we rely on noiseprint, a recently proposed CNN-based
camera model fingerprint. The CNN is trained to minimize the
distance between same-model patches, and maximize the distance
otherwise. As a result, the noiseprint accounts for model-related
artifacts just like the PRNU accounts for device-related non-
uniformities. However, unlike the PRNU, it is only mildly affected
by residuals of high-level scene content. The experiments show
that the proposed noiseprint-based forgery localization method
improves over the PRNU-based reference.
Index Terms—Image forensics, PRNU, convolutional neural
networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the widespread diffusion of powerful media editing
tools, falsifying images and videos has become easier and
easier in the last few years. Manipulated visual content, often
used to support fake news, represents a growing menace
in many fields of life, from politics, to journalism, to the
judiciary. In response to this threat, a large number of methods
have been recently proposed for image forgery detection and
localization [1].
Supervised methods which exploit the presence of camera
artifacts in the image under analysis [2], [3], especially those
relying on the PRNU pattern [4], have shown great potential
for many forensic tasks. The PRNU, caused by sensor defects
arising in the manufacturing process, links univocally each
photo to the device that acquired it, and can be therefore
regarded as a sort of device fingerprint. PRNU-based meth-
ods have shown a very good performance for both source
identification and image forgery detection [4]–[9]. The camera
PRNU pattern must be accurately estimated in advance, which
requires the availability of the camera itself or of a certain
number of photos (typically, 100-200) taken from it. At testing
time, this reference pattern is compared with the single-image
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PRNU estimate extracted from the image under analysis.
For camera identification, the comparison takes place on the
whole image. Instead, for forgery detection and localization,
a sliding-window correlation-based procedure is used. In the
presence of a forgery, the reference PRNU is missing, and a
low correlation is observed.
Ideally, this procedure allows one to detect and localize
accurately all attacks to the image under test. In practice,
the PRNU traces found in any individual image represent
a very weak signal in strong noise (scene residuals, camera
artifacts) which makes the whole process quite unreliable. To
improve the signal-to-noise ratio, the high-level scene content
(seen as noise in this context) is removed my means of
suitable denoising filters, obtaining a noise residual which
represents the desired single-image PRNU estimate. However,
due to imperfections of denoising filters, some scene contents
leak in the noise residual, inducing false alarms in dark,
uniform, or very textured areas. Besides using state-of-the-art
denoising filters [10], [11], a number of strategies have been
proposed to face this problem. In [5] a predictor is used to
identify potentially troubling regions and adapt the statistical
test locally, while in [12] the interference of scene details is
reduced by selective attenuation of wavelet coefficients.
A further source of noise, besides scene residuals, is rep-
resented by the so-called non-unique artifacts [13], traces of
in-camera processes which are specific of a camera model
but not of the individual device. Such artifacts are caused,
for example, by JPEG compression or CFA interpolation, and
are characterized by spatially periodic patterns. Again, various
strategies have been proposed to remove them [5], [14].
However, one should remember that estimating the PRNU
is not a goal in itself, but a means towards the completion of
forensic tasks. Do model-related artifacts really hamper such
tasks? Or else can they be exploited to improve performance?
Under an information-theoretic point of view, the answer
is obvious: all available information should be taken into
account. Based on this line of thought, in [15] we proposed a
new approach to identify the camera model traces and exploit
them for multimedia forensics. Unlike in the prior literature,
which focuses on compact features, we extract a PRNU-like
camera model fingerprint, called noiseprint, which displays
non-unique artifacts in the form of an image-size pattern (see
Fig.1). The scene content is effectively removed by means
of a siamese residual-based convolutional neural network,
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obtaining eventually a strong pattern affected by weak noise,
which allows the easy (even visual) detection and localization
of anomalies due to local image manipulations.
In [15] we developed a totally blind noiseprint-based forgery
localization technique, working only on the image residual
(single-image noiseprint estimate) with no side information.
Here, we consider the same problem in a supervised setting.
Given a suitable training set of images, a reliable estimate
of the noiseprint is built, and used in a PRNU-like fashion
to discover anomalies in the residual of the image under
analysis. In fact, when a region of the image is tampered
with, its noiseprint is perturbed, that is, replaced with a new
one (splicing), strongly modified (rotation, resizing), or even
deleted (inpainting), which allows one to detect and localize
the attack. It is worth reminding that the noiseprint contains
only weak traces of the PRNU itself, hence it is not device-
specific. Therefore, it should not be regarded as a substitute of
the PRNU. On the other hand, the noiseprint has a much higher
signal-to-noise ratio than the PRNU pattern, a property which
guarantees a better performance and allows its applications to
more challenging situations.
In the reminder of the paper we give some more details on
noiseprint, then describe the proposed noiseprint-based forgery
localization procedure, finally we discuss experimental results
and draw conclusions.
II. NOISEPRINT
In [15] we set the goal of extracting a noise-like image,
called noiseprint, which works as a camera model fingerprint,
much like the PRNU pattern can be regarded as a device finger-
print. In principle, this could be obtained by simply keeping
the noise residual without removing non-unique artifacts. In
practice, however, this residual does not possess the desired
properties, because it suffers from the very same problems as
the PRNU, caused by significant leakages from the high-level
signal. Therefore, we designed a new system, based on deep
learning, specifically dedicated to our goal.
To gain insight into our design choices, let us start from
the ultimate goal. Our system must accept in input a generic
image and provide in output a residual image, the noiseprint,
having the same size as the input and containing only camera-
model specific features with their natural spatial distribution.
This task reminds of residual-based denoisers, which extract
the additive Gaussian noise component of a given input image,
Fig. 1. Single-image (left) and 200-images (right) noiseprint estimates of the
same camera. In the first case, some scene contents (camel) leaked in the
estimate. In the second case, only periodic model-related artifacts are visible.
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Fig. 2. Proposed supervised forgery localization scheme.
thus removing the high-level content. Such denoisers are
trained by back-propagating the error between the the noise
residual output by the CNN and the true noise pattern. In our
problem, however, no true reference is available for training,
as the ideal noiseprint of a camera model is unknown.
Nonetheless, we know that images acquired by the same
camera model have the same noiseprint. We exploit this
information in the training phase by using pairs of images,
extracting their residuals in parallel, and computing their
distance (mean squared error). When the pair comes from the
same model, the error is back-propagated through the network
to reduce the distance between residuals. On the contrary,
when images come from different models, back-propagation
is used to increase the residual distance. Therefore, it is like
considering identical twin networks, working in parallel. Each
one uses the output of the other twin, together with the
same/different label, to adapt its weights towards convergence.
The idea of Siamese networks is not new in deep learning.
Typically, each twin net extracts a low-dimensional vector
(embedding) which summarizes the input keeping the relevant
information for the specific task. The main goal is to perform
a low-complexity comparison of the twin outputs. In our
case, however, the aim is not reducing complexity, while it
is important to preserve spatial information. Hence, our net
must preserve image size and spatial relationships.
Turning to the practical implementation, we initialize the
network (ideally, the Siamese nets) as the CNN denoiser
proposed in [16] for AWGN (additive white Gaussian noise)
image denoising. Removing the scene content, in fact, is
a reasonable starting point for our goal. To limit training
complexity, and also to ensure flexibility w.r.t. input size,
we work on small image patches, rather than whole images.
Hence, we feed the network with a large number of paired
patches, with label +1 when they refer to the same camera
model and the same spatial location, and label −1 otherwise.
The constraint on the spatial location is necessary to preserve
the precious spatial information. In fact, even a single-pixel
shift impacts heavily on the local statistics of the residual. The
distance between the CNN outputs of the two paired patches
is then computed. In the loss function, pairs with negative
label (different model and/or different position) are penalized.
Therefore, at convergence the net should extract the same
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Fig. 3. ROCs at pixel level by varying the number of images for estimation (200,50,10,1).
residual for positive samples, and different residuals otherwise.
It is worth underlining that the network is trained once and
for all, it can process any camera, both inside and outside
the training set, and is not specific of a given experiment,
or task. Therefore, once the training is over, the noiseprint is
deterministically related to the original image.
We refer the interested reader to [15] for details on the train-
ing phase. Here, we mention only two key solutions adopted
to improve the training efficiency, the method proposed in [17]
to obtain O(n2) rather than O(n) samples for each n-patch
minibatch, and the distance based logistic (DBL) loss proposed
in [18].
III. USING NOISEPRINT IN A SUPERVISED SETTING
In [15] we performed forgery localization with no side
information, by looking for anomalies in the image residual.
Here, we consider a supervised setting, assuming a reference
noiseprint is available. The localization procedure is outlined
in Fig.2 and follows the classic pipeline used with PRNU-
based methods. We rely on a set of pristine images taken
by the same camera of the image under analysis. Their
residuals are averaged to obtain a clean reference, namely,
a reliable estimate of the camera noiseprint where high-level
scene leakages, as well as traces of the PRNU, are mostly
removed. Fig.1 shows a single-image estimate, in which traces
of the high-level content can be easily spotted (see the camel
image in Fig.4), and a 200-image estimate which is virtually
noise-free. This reference is then compared in sliding window
modality with the residual of the image under test, using the
Euclidean distance as a measure of similarity. As usual in
these cases, the window size impacts on the trade-off between
resolution and reliability. Here, a 64×64 window is used.
The pixel-wise distance field can then be shown as a
heatmap, which can be provided to the end user for visual
inspection or subject to a suitable post-processing to extract
a binary decision map. Large distances (red in the heatmaps)
suggest that the original noiseprint has been corrupted, that is,
deleted (inpainting), replaced with the noiseprint of another
camera (splicing), or even of the same camera but after some
geometrical distortion (resizing, rotation, even simple displace-
ment). Therefore, even a rigid copy-move can be discovered,
unless the displacement in both the vertical and horizontal
directions is a multiple of the noiseprint fundamental period. It
is worth underlining, however, that this approach makes sense
only if the test image is aligned with the pristine reference
images. If the test image is geometrically distorted or subject
to heavy compression, also the references should undergo
the same processing chain to deliver a correct reeference
noiseprint.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
The network used to extract all noiseprints is trained on a
large variety of models. To this end, we created a large dataset,
including both cameras and smartphones, using various pub-
licly available datasets, plus some other private cameras. In
detail, we used 44 cameras from the Dresden dataset [19],
32 from Socrates dataset [20], 32 from VISION [21], 17
from our private dataset, totaling 125 individual cameras from
70 different models and 19 brands. In the experiments, this
dataset is split in training-set and validation-set comprising
100 and 25 cameras, respectively. All images are originally
in JPEG format with a quality factor in the range [96-99].
The network is initialized with the weights of the denoising
network of [16]. During training, each minibatch contains 200
patches of 48×48 pixels extracted from 100 different images
of 25 different cameras. In each batch, there are 50 sets, each
one formed by 4 patches with same camera and position.
Training is performed using ADAM optimizer; the hyper-
parameters (learning rate, number of iterations and weight of
regularization term) are chosen using the validation set.
For image forgery localization, we compare results with the
PRNU-based method proposed in [4] (Lukas2006) and with
a feature-based approach relying on camera model artifacts
[2] (Verdoliva2014). We use the same 300-image dataset with
splicings already used in [6]. Images come from 4 camera
models (CanonEOS 450D, Nikon D200, CanonIXUS 95IS,
NikonCoolpix S5100) none of which used for training the
network.
In Fig.3(left) we show pixel-level localization results in
terms of receiver operating curves (ROC) when 200 images
are used to estimate the reference noiseprint, PRNU, or the
statistic of [2]. The proposed method provides a large gain
over the Lukas2006, and also over Verdoliva2014. Synthetic
results reported in Tab.I, in terms of area under curve (AUC)
and F-measure, fully confirm this analysis. For F-measure we
used both the best threshold over all the dataset and (more
TABLE I
PIXEL-LEVEL LOCALIZATION PERFORMANCE.
Lukas2006 Verdoliva2014 Proposed
AUC 0.876 0.926 0.967
F1 0.499 0.580 0.724
F1-oracle 0.572 0.707 0.850
favourable for performance) the best threshold for each image
(F1-oracle). In all cases, the performance gain of the proposed
method is clear. The very same conclusions can be drawn by
visual inspection of the examples shown in Fig.4, where very
different types of manipulation have been considered (splicing,
rigid copy-move, inpainting). Note that all images have the
native camera JPEG quality, and no further compression is
carried out. The noiseprint-based method exhibits always a
very good performance, highlighting clearly the manipulations
without false alarms.
As we remarked several times, the noiseprint appears to
be less noisy than the PRNU pattern. Therefore, unlike for
PRNU-based methdos, we may expect the performance to
depend only weakly on the number of reference images. To
investigate this point, we repeated the previous experiment
using only 50, 10, and 1 reference images, respectively. The
corresponding ROCs, also shown in Fig.3, confirm noiseprint
robustness. While the performance of the other methods are
largely impaired when less than 50 images are used, the
proposed method works reasonably well even with a single
reference image, and better than Lukas2006 with 200 images.
In the last experiment we consider a more challenging
situation, where the images have a different format, and hence
are not well aligned with our dataset. We take some examples
from the dataset used by Korus et al. [9]. The images are
taken from 4 different camera models (Canon 60D, Sony A57,
Nikon D7000 and Nikon D90) and attacked with different
forms of manipulations. They are in raw format, hence no
JPEG artifacts are present, a significant mis-alignment with
respect to the trained CNN. We use the PRNU provided with
this dataset, estimated over 200 natural images for Nikon and
Canon, and over 20 flat images for Sony. For noiseprint and for
[2] we used only the 53 available pristine images, taking care
to avoid using the same background in training and test. As
expected, Lukas2006 works better than in the previous case,
since images are not compressed, while the performance of the
proposed method is impaired due to the mis-alignment. Even
in this critical situation, however, the noiseprint-based method
keeps providing valuable hints for forgery localization.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We performed image forgery localization by a sliding-
window comparison of image residual and camera fingerprint.
Unlike in the recent literature, we do not use the PRNU
fingerprint to this end, but a new camera model fingerprint,
called noiseprint, extracted by means of a suitably trained
Siamese CNN. Experiments show that the noiseprint-based
method outperforms largely the PRNU-based baseline, and
keeps providing very good results even when the fingerprint
is estimated on a very small number of images. Overall,
noiseprint appears to have a great potential for multimedia
forensic analyses, both in supervised and blind settings.
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Fig. 4. Forgery localization results for some selected examples. From top to bottom: splicing, rigid copy-move, inpainting.
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Fig. 5. Forgery localization results for some selected examples using the dataset proposed in [9]. Even if the images are in raw format and estimation is
carried out on less data with respect to PRNU, results for the proposed approach are promising.
